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ABSTRACT
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA)
attempts to regulate a nonexistent market failure. Regulators must
understand the two market relationships in the software industry,
the producer-consumer relationship and the producer-thief
relationship, before they can draft effective regulation. Drafting
regulations that affect both relationships can lead to market
disruptions at best and market failure at worst. An analysis of the
two relationships reveals that there has not been a market failure
that needs regulating; rather, there is a lag in technology that
prohibits proper demarcation between the two market
relationships. Regulators should wait for technology to advance
before adopting any legislation similar to UCITA.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Imagine yourself purchasing a software product in your local store.
You open the box and insert the CD. You check the box next to "I agree,"
click the "OK" button and the program installs. Ten days later, when you
attempt to use the product, it fails to run. You seek a refund only to find out
there is no recourse because the license to which you agreed now bars your
use of the software. Sound farfetched? Not anymore.
¶2
Software licensors have ramped up their licensing enforcement
procedures to combat rampant software piracy. In 2007 alone, the global
software market reportedly lost $47 billion to software piracy, 2 representing
a 38% global piracy rate, 3 causing a 33% loss of revenue. 4 Licensors have
1

J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, B.S. in Electrical and
Computer Engineering from Cornell University 2005.
2
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, FIFTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY STUDY: STUDY HIGHLIGHTS (May 2008), available at
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/studies/highlights_globalstudy07.pdf
[hereinafter BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—HIGHLIGHTS].
3
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, FIFTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE
PIRACY STUDY: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS (May 2008), available at
http://global.bsa.org/idcglobalstudy2007/studies/summaryfindings_globalstudy0
7.pdf [hereinafter BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—SUMMARY].
4
See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 2 (noting that for
every two dollars spent on software, one dollar was lost to pirates).
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been fighting back with tougher license terms, which restrict use and
installation. 5 They have also lobbied for legislation and regulations seeking
to enforce these harsh license terms. 6 This lobbying led to the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which, if adopted, would
establish a framework of rules to guide and direct all transactions of
software. 7 Since its inception, UCITA has met heated opposition from
consumer groups and from the attorneys general of many states. 8
The debate reached a critical juncture in 2008 when Electronic Arts
(EA) released its highly anticipated product, “Spore.” Unbeknownst to
many consumers, “Spore” came packaged with a piece of Digital Rights
Management (DRM) software that severely limited use through restrictive
licensing. 9 The backlash was unprecedented. On Amazon, the average
rating for the product was a paltry one-and-a-half stars with over 2,800
reviews. 10 In response to this and other negative consumer actions, EA
relaxed the terms of the DRM to allow for more use 11 and even relaxed
some DRM terms of one of its future products. 12
¶3

¶4
The “Spore” DRM controversy revealed many shortcomings of a
framework based on UCITA, and ultimately, how unnecessary UCITA is in
the current market. This iBrief first explores some of the terms of UCITA
and the current three-party market relationship within the software industry.
It then argues that there has been no market failure in the software industry;

5

For a discussion of the terms of the Spore DRM, see discussion infra Part II.A.
For a presentation of a brief history and summary of the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act, see discussion infra Part I.A.
7
For a presentation of some of the motivations behind UCITA and some of its
goals, see discussion infra Part I.A. A draft of UCITA can be found online at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita1200.pdf. Comments can
be found online at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita600c.pdf.
8
Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, BADSOFTWARE.COM, Sept. 16,
2000, http://www.badsoftware.com/claw2000.htm.
9
See Ben Fritz, ‘Spore’s’ DRM Restrictions Irk Gamers, VARIETY, Sept. 19,
2008, http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117992527.html (noting that the
DRM limited the number of installations and required internet connectivity each
time a consumer wanted to use “Spore”).
10
Id. A quick search on Amazon for “Spore” reveals its low rating has not
changed since the writing of the Fritz article.
11
Frederic Lardinois, Electronic Arts Evolves: Slightly Relaxes Spore DRM,
READWRITEWEB, Sept. 22, 2008,
http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/electronic_arts_relaxes_spore_drm.php.
12
See Jimmy Thang, Red Alert 3 Eases Up on DRM, IGN, Sept. 9, 2008,
http://pc.ign.com/articles/908/908755p1.html (noting Red Alert 3 would be
useable without having the CD in the drive and could be installed up to five
times).
6
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rather, there is a lag in license technology. This lag coupled with the
misunderstanding surrounding the current three-party model in the software
market creates a dynamic market race. Legislators should wait for the
technology and the market to evolve and settle before adopting any legal
framework resembling UCITA. Finally, this iBrief suggests some courses
of action legislators can take to address license enforcement when the lag in
technology be resolved.

I. THE UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT
UCITA was originally proposed as an amendment to Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 13 After facing much opposition to
its bias in favor of licensors, the drafters abandoned the direct amendment
to the UCC and sought to promulgate the amendment as a separate act,
which became known as UCITA. 14 This Part will discuss some key policies
that motivated the drafters and some of UCITA’s more controversial terms
and consequences.
¶5

A. Policies and Terms
¶6
As the number of personal computers and the spread of the Internet
grew in the 1990s, so did the amount of software distribution.15
Distributors quickly realized that the traditional laws governing sales of
goods under Article 2 of the UCC were insufficient for the sale of software
in three important ways. 16 First, while traditional manufactured goods have
clear owners prior and subsequent to sale, many sales of software involve
licensed products with complex ownership arrangements. 17 Second, a
transaction for software no longer involved a tangible object, but a license
granting a set of rights to intangible code; as many commentators have

13

Hans Anderson, Jeff Raymakers & Jonathan Reichenthal, The History of
UCITA, Mar. 2001, http://www-cse.stanford.edu/class/cs201/projects-0001/ucita/history.html.
14
Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL as
Separate Act, ALI REP., Spring 1999,
http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R2103_Art2b.htm.
15
See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT prefatory note at 1 (2000),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita1200.pdf
[hereinafter Comments] (noting information products and services are now
driving economic growth).
16
See id. (noting Article 2 rules written to handle sales of manufactured goods
were inadequate when applied to sales of software or other computer
information, and stating rules that inadequately govern a transaction drive up
transaction costs).
17
Id. at 2.
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noted, the license defines the product. 18 The last problem concerns the
evolution of traditional market relationships. Historically, one producer and
one consumer negotiated the terms of a transaction, but with the emergence
of the Internet, software licensors often found themselves marketing
software to a massive, faceless consumer base. 19 While many cases have
addressed the enforceability of commercial software licenses under the
UCC, the holdings often contradicted each other and left an indefinite legal
landscape. 20
¶7
UCITA’s drafters wanted a set of uniform rules that lowered
transaction costs in the developing software market. 21 Indefiniteness drives
up transaction costs, so the UCITA drafters provided a definite legal
framework that presumably makes software license terms enforceable.
First, “[a] contract may be formed in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including . . . operations of electronic agents which recognize
the existence of a contract.” 22 Second, “[a] person that uses an electronic
agent for making an . . . agreement, including manifestation of assent, is
bound by the operations of the electronic agent, even if no individual was
aware of or reviewed the agent’s operations or the results of the
operations.” 23 UCITA has established a framework where software license

18

Id. at 2; J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public
Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 903 (1999).
19
See Priscilla A. Walter, UCITA: Establishing a Legal Infrastructure for ECommerce, DRINKERBIDDLE.COM, 2000, at 2, available at
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/2a3765c9-cb95-4295-b1d7940942157b98/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1ebc303d-9496-471f-a34163a52037f6c6/UCITA2.pdf (noting software licensors are now marketing to
large enterprises rather than to small buyers).
20
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
arbitration clause in a license located within a shipping box for a computer was
enforceable against the buyer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding terms of a shrinkwrap license are enforceable unless they
violate established law, public policy, or unconscionability); M.A. Mortenson
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (holding a
limitation of remedies clause in a shrinkwrap license was enforceable because it
was not unconscionable). But see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939
F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding terms of a software box-top license were not
part of the contract between producer and consumer); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340–41 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding the consumer was the
offeror and therefore, the consumer had to agree to the producer Gateway’s
additional shrinkwrap license terms before they were enforceable).
21
Comments, supra note 15, at 1.
22
UNIF. COMPUTERS INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 202(a) (2000) [hereinafter
UCITA].
23
Id. § 107(d).
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terms, no matter how hidden, become enforceable so long as a consumer
clicks “Ok” or “I Agree” and the terms are not unconscionable. 24 The
license, however, may alter what conduct manifests assent; a mouseclick
may not even be necessary. 25
¶8
Another practical consequence of operating in the software market
is that the technology changes rapidly, and therefore, so do the market and
contract terms. To ease transaction costs associated generally with
modifying contract terms, UCITA removes some of the traditional hurdles
of modification. “An agreement modifying a contract subject to this [Act]
needs no consideration to be binding.” 26 Coupled with the simple conduct
sufficient to manifest assent, contracts formed under UCITA can be
modified much more easily than traditional contracts. A modification may
involve nothing more than a notification message or email and a consumer’s
continued use of the product to manifest assent.

UCITA also provides some quick remedies, most notably self-help,
to breaches of contract. Upon breach and “cancellation of a license, the
licensor has the right . . . to prevent the continued exercise of contractual
and informational rights in the licensed information under the license.” 27
UCITA imposes restrictions on self-help to prevent complete market
failure. 28 The licensor also has the right to repossess any of the licensed
information. 29 A licensee has the rights to recover damages 30 and to seek
an injunction if a licensor does not adhere to the self-help restrictions. 31
¶9

Despite efforts to reach a balanced solution to the market problems,
the amendment to Article 2 of the UCC was met with opposition over its
provisions and coherency. 32 After the American Law Institute removed
themselves from the drafting process, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws pushed the draft as a Uniform Act,
¶10

24

Id. § 111.
Id. § 112(f).
26
Id. § 303(a).
27
Id. § 815(a)(2).
28
See id. § 815(b) (allowing self-help only when it will not “breach . . . the
peace” and when it will not cause a “foreseeable risk of personal injury or
significant damage to information or property”); id., § 815 cmt. 3 (reiterating the
conditions allowing self-help); id. § 816(b) (preventing self-help for mass
market licenses).
29
Id. § 815(a).
30
Id. § 816(e).
31
Id. § 816(g).
32
Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by NCCUSL as
Separate Act, supra note 14.
25
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now called UCITA. 33 The next Part will discuss some of the opposition and
concerns surrounding UCITA.

B. Outrage and Opposition
¶11
Commentators have heavily criticized UCITA for its bias in favor
of licensors. 34 They fear that UCITA will drive up the cost of software
transactions and reduce consumer power. 35 Much of this fear centers on the
broad authority given to producers to specify and modify contract terms
without any negotiation or significant assent from consumers, 36 and on the
remedies available to producers upon breach. 37
¶12
First, commentators are concerned the enforcement of shrinkwrap
and box-top license terms will lead to a skewed marketplace. Some judges
have taken the position that software license terms may be unenforceable
because they were not bargained-for pieces of the original contract, 38 while
other judges have found them to be enforceable 39 . The difference in
outcomes under the UCC shows significant judicial discretion in
determining the state of the disputed market transaction before enforcing or

33

Id.
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, What’s Wrong with
UCITA?, http://affect.ucita.com/what_problems.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2009); Ed Foster, What is UCITA?, INFOWORLD, Jan. 3, 2002,
http://www.infoworld.com/articles/uc/xml/02/01/03/020103ucwhatis.html (on
file with author).
35
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, supra note 34.
36
See id. (noting UCITA will make it hard for consumers to challenge
shrinkwrap license terms and to notice contract modifications). For a discussion
of the lax standards governing assent in UCITA, see supra Part II.A.
37
See supra Part II.A (discussing the self-help remedy).
38
See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105–06 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding terms of a software box-top license were not part of the contract
between producer and consumer); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding Gateway’s additional shrinkwrap license
terms were unenforceable because buyer never expressly agreed to them).
39
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
arbitration clause in a license located within a shipping box for a computer were
enforceable against the buyer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding terms of a shrinkwrap license were enforceable unless
they violated established and general contract principles); M.A. Mortenson Co.
v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (holding a limitation
of remedies clause in a shrinkwrap license was enforceable because it was not
unconscionable).
34
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ignoring license terms. Under UCITA, the enforceability of such terms
would be unquestionable and independent of the marketplace. 40
¶13
Another concern of commentators is that consumers will be
unaware of contract modifications under UCITA. The proposed Act
removes the requirement for consideration and lowers the required amount
of notification necessary to make modifications of license terms. 41 UCITA
opens the door for bait-and-switch tactics that a typical consumer may never
notice. 42

Even more troubling for many commentators is the possibility of
self-help remedies. 43 These remedies would authorize licensors to remotely
shut down software systems upon learning of a breach. 44 Certain
commentators have referred to self-help remedies as “time bombs.” 45
Others describe self-help remedies as a means of holding companies
hostage to licensors’ future demands. 46 However classified, these
commentators view self-help as the antithesis of a free market.
¶14

All of the UCITA pitfalls combined could lead to one giant mess.
Consider the following scenario. A licensor could sell a piece of software
to a business with take-it-or-leave-it license terms. After a few months, the
licensor could change the license to contain terms that are contrary to the
business’s current usage and to which the business would never have agreed
originally. The licensor would post the changes to an obscure page on its
website and the business would continue using the software unaware of
these changes. 47 The licensor could then alert the business and threaten to

¶15

40

For a discussion noting that software license terms are presumably
enforceable once agreement has been reached under a light standard of
discerning assent, see supra Part II.A.
41
For a discussion of UCITA’s departure from traditional contract law
pertaining to contract modification, see supra Part II.A.
42
Ed Foster, UCITA Pitfalls, INFOWORLD, Aug. 18, 2000,
http://www.infoworld.com/articles/uc/xml/00/08/21/000821ucissues.html (on
file with author) (noting licensors could modify existing terms of an agreement
by posting a message on their website without alerting consumers of the website
or requiring the website be viewed) [hereinafter Foster, UCITA Pitfalls]; see
Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, supra note 34 (noting
licensors can modify terms of certain contracts unilaterally after agreement).
43
For a discussion of self-help remedies and their limitations under UCITA, see
supra Part II.A.
44
Id.
45
Foster, UCITA Pitfalls, supra note 42.
46
See Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, supra note 34
(noting UCITA authorizes licensors to shut down mission critical software
because of license disputes).
47
Under UCITA, posting changes anywhere on the website would suffice as
notification and assent. Foster, UCITA Pitfalls, supra note 42.
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deactivate all the software unless the business stopped use or paid for its
breach. In essence, the licensor could force the business’s hand and remove
any market power it ever had.
Despite its noble goals, UCITA has met stern opposition over its
means. The Federal Trade Commission and the attorneys general of
twenty-six states have publicly criticized UCITA for its bias in favor of
producers. 48 These officials and commentators are troubled by licensors’
forcefully eliminating consumer power. 49 An analysis of the true state of
the market, however, reveals that any regulation of the software market is
ultimately unnecessary.
¶16

II. STATE OF THE MARKET
Understanding the players in the software market and how they
interact is critical in developing proper regulation. If regulations are too
broad, they threaten the market by affecting untargeted parties. If they are
too limited, they will not bring about the desired solutions. The software
market contains three key players: producers, consumers, and thieves. This
Part discusses each role and the interactions between producers and
consumers as well as between producers and thieves. 50
¶17

A. Producer-Consumer Relationship
¶18
The producer-consumer relationship generates the revenues for the
software industry. Producers create software that is bought at market by the
consumers. 51 The paradoxical struggle between producers and consumers
concerns market power: whoever has the most market power receives the
most favorable license terms. Producers want terms that protect their
intellectual property while consumers want terms that maximize their right
to use the product. 52

48

Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, supra note 34.
For example, self-help remedies may remove a consumer’s ability to
renegotiate fairly with producers by holding consumers hostage to the
producers’ demands.
50
This paper assumes consumers are mutually exclusive from thieves; once a
consumer does anything illegal (e.g. stealing software), he falls into the thief
category. While hypothetical situations exist where thieves can steal software
from individual consumers, this paper eliminates those largely irrelevant and
highly irregular relationships for the sake of simplicity.
51
A relationship that is similar in any other market.
52
See Mark Methenitis, Law of the Game on Joystiq: Rare Footage of the DRM
in Its Natural Habitat, JOYSTIQ, Sept. 19, 2008,
http://www.joystiq.com/2008/09/19/law-of-the-game-on-joystiq-rare-footage-ofthe-drm-in-its-natur (noting consumers demand a world of unrestricted use
while producers demand to “lock down media in every conceivable way”).
49
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As personal computing began to take root and grow, software
producers began to package licenses with their products to curtail undesired
uses by a large faceless consumer market. Consumers could do little to
control the terms in these licenses. After the emergence of the Internet,
consumers realized they could use technology to form a collective voice and
challenge producers’ license terms, culminating in their recent market
victory with EA’s “Spore.”

¶19

1. Market Power: In the Beginning
¶20
The interaction between software producers and consumers is
notably different from those in other markets. Software licensing occurs at
the crossroads of copyright law and contract law. Copyrights protect the
intellectual property contained within the software, but they do not
adequately protect producers from the legal consequences of many other
forms of consumer use. 53 Producers need to enter into contract agreements
with consumers to restrict undesired uses. 54 However, producers can not sit
down and negotiate contracts with each individual user in the mass market.
Shrinkwrap and box-top licenses became the solution. 55 Despite the lack of
negotiation, courts did treat some of these licenses as enforceable
contracts. 56
¶21
Consumers generally exercised very little market power in
controlling license terms. While software producers operated at an industry
level and interacted with a large faceless market, consumers still operated at
the individual, personal computing level. Without any means to band
together, consumers were stuck with software producers who called the
shots. 57

2. The Internet and the Rise of Consumer Market Power
53

Paul Goodman, Shrink Wrap License Agreements: Unravelling Some of the
Confusing Legal Issues, MACTECH,
http://www.mactech.com/articles/mactech/Vol.09/09.03/Shrinkwrap/index.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
arbitration clause in a license located within a shipping box for a computer were
enforceable against the buyer); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding terms of a shrinkwrap license were enforceable unless
they violated established and general contract principles ); M.A. Mortenson Co.
v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (holding a limitation
of remedies clause in a shrinkwrap license was enforceable because it was not
unconscionable).
57
This is not to say that all software license terms were oppressive or that
consumers often challenged them.
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The Internet provided the missing means for consumers to form a
collective voice. The power of the collective voice became evident during
the release of EA’s hyped product, “Spore,” which they released in 2008.
Unbeknownst to many consumers, “Spore” came packaged with a piece of
DRM software that severely limited use through restrictive licensing. 58 The
backlash was unprecedented. On Amazon, the average rating for the
product was a paltry one-and-a-half stars with over 2,800 reviews. 59
Discussion and outrage flooded news sites and forums. 60 A class action
lawsuit was even filed against EA. 61
¶22

¶23
In response, EA relaxed the terms of the DRM to allow for more
use 62 and even relaxed some DRM terms of one of its future products. 63
Eventually, EA produced a version of “Spore” that did not contain the harsh
DRM. It also launched a de-authorization tool for consumers who
purchased a copy of “Spore” that contained the DRM. 64
¶24
The Internet provides software consumers with a means of
acquiring market power. EA discovered that the once faceless consumer
market now had a public voice capable of negotiation; consumers were now
capable of shopping for the license terms they wanted. If EA refused to
alter the license terms, consumers refused to buy and told the world why.
¶25
The changes did not end with “Spore.” EA changed license terms
for its subsequent products as well. While high sales figures for “Spore”
were important for EA, they also realized their business reputation was at
risk. If they persisted in marketing undesired license terms, consumers

58

See Fritz, supra note 9 (noting the DRM limited the number of installations
and required internet connectivity each time a consumer wanted to use “Spore”).
59
Id. A quick search on Amazon for “Spore” reveals its low rating has not
changed since the writing of the Fritz article.
60
Id.; see also Erick Schonfeld, Spore and the Great DRM Backlash,
TECHCRUNCH, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/09/14/sporeand-the-great-drm-backlash (discussing consumers’ frustrations with the
“Spore” DRM and with EA’s refusal to elect alternatives).
61
Kris Pigna, EA Hit with Class Action Lawsuit over Spore DRM, 1UP, Sept. 24,
2008, http://www.1up.com/do/newsStory?cId=3170131. A copy of the
complaint in the class action lawsuit can be found at
http://www.courthousenews.com/2008/09/23/Spore.pdf.
62
Lardinois, supra note 11.
63
See Thang, supra note 12 (noting Red Alert 3 would be useable without
having the CD in the drive and could be installed up to five times).
64
Posting of Soulskill to Slashdot.org,
http://games.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/12/20/0052247 (Dec. 19, 2008, 21:13
EST).
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might not buy their future products. 65 As a result, EA changed DRM
restrictions on their future products and eventually provided a way to
remove the DRM restrictions on “Spore.”
The Internet has provided consumers a newfound market power in
transactions involving software. It has given them a collective voice with
which they can negotiate against software producers for favorable license
terms. Producers that fail to negotiate or refuse to compromise subject their
licenses to public scrutiny and risk poor sales. 66
¶26

B. Producer-Thief Relationship
A distinctive characteristic of the software industry is the extension
of market relationships beyond the standard two-party model of contract
negotiation. 67 Thieves comprise a significant third party that motivates the
market with an often unseen hand. In 2007 alone, the global software
market reportedly lost $47 billion to software piracy, 68 representing a 38%
piracy rate, 69 and a 33% loss of revenue. 70 Therefore, targeting piracy is a
chief concern of any software producer.
¶27

¶28
The software market is one of the few markets in which thieves
actually affect market power. One primary goal of software licensing is to
discourage piracy by making it more burdensome for people to pirate the
product. 71 The terms of any software license are determined in large part
by piracy concerns; the more piracy, the harsher the license terms. 72 As
piracy increases, consumers are left to foot the bill of harsher and less
desirable terms.

Understanding the relationship between producers and thieves
becomes critical when devising any regulatory scheme. Thieves motivate
and impact the negotiations between producers and consumers. For
example, EA attempted to prevent high, piracy-related revenue loss by
incorporating extremely restrictive DRM when they released Spore. Spore
¶29

65

See Schonfeld, supra note 60 (saying EA experienced a backlash, not because
consumers disliked the game, but because consumers did not like EA telling
them what they could and could not do).
66
Shrinkwrap licenses were traditionally only viewable by a purchaser.
67
For an in-depth look at a two-party model analysis of the software market, see
Reichman & Franklin, supra note 18, at 897.
68
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 2.
69
BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—SUMMARY, supra note 3.
70
See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 2 (noting for every
two dollars spent on software, one dollar was lost to pirates).
71
Methenitis, supra note 52.
72
Id. (“The less piracy there is, the less need for over-the-top DRM solutions
there is.”).
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provides a clear example of the spillover between antipiracy measures and
consumer usability.
¶30
Yet the producer-thief relationship is distinct from the producerconsumer relationship because thieves are not parties to any contracts or
licenses. Regulators must treat the producer-thief relationship separately
from the producer-consumer relationship, which could have dire
consequences for the software market. 73

III. CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS
¶31
The “Spore” DRM controversy revealed many shortcomings of a
framework based on UCITA, 74 and ultimately, how unnecessary UCITA is
in the current market. This Part will first explore the consequences of
regulating the three-party market relationship within the software industry.
It then argues that there has been no market failure in the software industry;
rather, there is a lag in license technology. This lag coupled with the
misunderstanding surrounding the current three-party model in the software
market creates a dynamic market race. Legislators should wait for the
technology and the market to evolve and settle before adopting any legal
framework resembling UCITA. Finally, this Part suggests some courses of
action legislators can take to address license enforcement should the lag in
technology be resolved.

A. Consequences of the Three-Party Model
Failing to separate the producer-consumer relationship from the
consumer-thief relationship leads to broad and unnecessary regulation.
UCITA attempts to enforce software license terms across the entire market
without accounting for the differences between producers and consumers
and between producers and thieves. While efficient in reducing transaction
costs, this regulation will lead to market disruption at best and market
failure at worst.

¶32

Regulations that target the producer-consumer relationship will be
ineffective. Consumers have already demonstrated through the “Spore”
fiasco that forcing license terms upon them leads to inefficient markets. 75
Consumers now have enough market power to seek better license terms and
to ignore unfavorable ones. An UCITA regulatory framework, in which
license terms would be binding on consumers, would be ineffective in
¶33

73

For a discussion of the market breakdown if regulations for the producer-thief
relationship are applied to the producer-consumer relationship, see infra Part
III.A.
74
For a discussion of the fallout from the “Spore” DRM, see supra Part II.A.2.
75
For a discussion of how consumer ire and collective effort forced Electronic
Arts to lighten their license terms, see supra Part II.A.2.
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enforcing producers’ terms because consumers would simply refuse to buy
as a collective unit until the producers relaxed their license terms. This is a
prime example of market success rather than market failure in need of
regulation. UCITA is not needed to guide the producer-consumer
relationship.
¶34
Even supposing that consumers would accept harsh license terms
enforced by UCITA, the market would not benefit. Enforcing harsh license
terms against consumers and thieves minimizes costs for producers. 76 This
reduction in cost could lead to larger market failures down the road.
Consumers have been disgruntled with harsh license terms because they feel
producers treat them like thieves. 77 As more and more consumers become
disgruntled, the amount of piracy may increase. 78 Increased piracy reduces
revenues, which offsets the initial cost savings of enforcing harsh license
terms. Regulations that cut across the entire market to affect the producerconsumer relationship and the producer-thief relationship ultimately are
ineffective or lead to market failure.
¶35
Regulations targeting the producer-thief relationship would yield
more efficient market results. Software producers want to maximize profits
by targeting pirates. 79 Reclaiming $47 billion would be a large boost to any
industry. 80 Proper regulation should provide producers with procedures
and remedies against pirates. By reducing piracy, producers would also be
able to offer less restrictive license terms against consumers. 81 Less
restrictive terms would free up market transactions and possibly reduce the
need for negotiations altogether between producers and consumers. 82
Ultimately, regulations that target the producer-thief relationship will be the

76

See Methenitis, supra note 52 (“The less piracy there is, the less need for
over-the-top DRM solutions there is.”).
77
See Fritz, supra note 9 (noting some consumer reviews saying “don’t treat me
like a thief”); Michael Santo, Spore’s DRM Panned on Amazon.com,
REALTECHNEWS, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.realtechnews.com/posts/6028
(noting one user remarked EA is treating a “paying customer” like a “filthy
pirating thief”).
78
See Posting of David Jenkins to Gamasutra, http://www.gamasutra.com/phpbin/news_index.php?story=21414 (Dec. 8, 2008, 5:14 PST) (claiming “Spore”
was the most pirated game in 2008 due in large part to disgruntled consumers
pirating the game).
79
See Julie E. Cohen, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management:
DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 575 (2003).
80
See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE—HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 2.
81
Methenitis, supra note 52 (“The less piracy there is, the less need for over-thetop DRM solutions there is.”).
82
For a discussion of how consumers used the Internet to force Electronic Arts
to renegotiate license terms, see supra Part II.A.2.
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best market solution. The problem lies in effectively separating consumers
from thieves.

B. Lag in Technology versus Market Failure
¶36
The need for regulation to target only the producer-thief
relationship reveals the true problem that all the parties are trying to resolve:
the lag in technology. If legislators wait for technology to advance before
adopting any regulatory measures, they will reach the most efficient market
solution. In order for regulation to efficiently target the producer-thief
relationship, it cannot overextend into the producer-consumer
relationship. 83 Yet technology has not advanced to the point where
producers can separate thieves from consumers. 84 Once technology
advances to the point where producers can draw such a line, then regulators
can draft efficient regulations.
¶37
These advances may not be far off. For example, one of the main
criticisms against the “Spore” DRM was that users had to connect to the
Internet each time to start playing. 85 This seemingly harsh term would be
inconsequential as Internet grows more ubiquitous. As server technologies
advance, producers will also be able to create more effective licenses that
encourage proper use rather than discourage improper use. For example,
licenses now have more network components than in the early days of
software licensing due to server and Internet advances. 86 The network
components allow producers to cheaply track and authenticate users as well
as provide users with network benefits once authenticated. These
technological advances will all provide better tools with which producers
and regulators can separate consumers from thieves.
¶38
Whether ubiquitous Internet use or advanced server technologies
allow for smarter authentication techniques, advances in technology must
occur to better mark the line between consumers and thieves. Otherwise,
legislators will be faced with an impossible task as all regulations will
necessarily affect both the producer-consumer and the producer-thief
relationship.

83

For a discussion of the market disruptions and failures caused by
overextending regulations such as UCITA, see supra Part III.A.
84
See Methenitis, supra note 52 (noting as piracy increased, producers chose the
simple solution of enforcing harsh license terms across the board). Had there
been a more efficient technological solution, producers would have chosen it.
85
Fritz, supra note 9.
86
See Methenitis, supra note 52 (noting copy protection originally was held on
individual disks or CDs, but digital distribution in the last few years has tied
accounts to systems).
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C. Proposed Regulation
¶39
Once technology has advanced so that producers can separate
consumers from thieves, then legislators can take steps to address the
producer-thief relationship. These steps may include enforcing tougher
criminal sanctions or providing producers with quick civil remedies for
claiming damages.
¶40
It will be easier to enforce criminal laws against thieves as
technology allows more efficient demarcation between consumer and thief.
Consumers will be more willing to authenticate themselves to separate
themselves from thieves, 87 and authentication will be an easier process. 88
As a result, unauthenticated use will be easier to detect and track. States
will have an easier time gathering evidence against thieves and will seek
criminal convictions against them.
¶41
Courts can also provide software producers with quick civil
remedies, such as levying fines, to recover damages against thieves.
Currently, organizations such as the Business Software Alliance 89 and the
Software & Information Industry Association 90 can only inform the public
and file civil lawsuits against thieves. 91 There is no mechanism through
which these organizations can recover damages without entering into
protracted civil suits. However, if producers can separate consumers from
thieves in an effective manner, it would be possible to give organizations
the power to levy fines against proven thieves.
¶42
Advances in licensing technology would open the door for tougher
and more accurate enforcement. The increased risk of criminal sanctions or
civil damages should raise the cost of piracy to the point where it is no
longer economically feasible to pirate software as opposed to buying it
legitimately.

87

See Fritz, supra note 9 (noting some consumer reviews saying “don’t treat me
like a thief”).
88
For a discussion noting that advances in server technology would encourage
proper use and create favorable licensing schemes, see supra Part III.B.
89
For more information about the Business Software Alliance, visit
http://www.bsa.org/country/Anti-Piracy.aspx.
90
For more information about the Software & Information Industry Association,
visit http://www.siia.net/piracy.
91
See, e.g., Software & Information Industry Association, Anti-Piracy FAQ,
http://www.siia.net/piracy/faq.asp (last visited March 20, 2009) (noting civil
suits are available to producers to recover damages, however fines are strictly
limited to the criminal context).

2009

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 4

CONCLUSION
¶43
Software piracy has been on the rise, but enforcing harsh software
license terms across the market through a regulatory device such as UCITA
is not an appropriate market solution. As demonstrated by the “Spore”
episode, regulation of the current software market would achieve nothing.
Consumers would simply refuse to buy products with harsh license terms,
forcing producers to redraft their licenses with more favorable terms. This
behavior is a sign of a healthy market rather than one that has failed and
needs to be regulated.
¶44
The proper solution is to use regulatory devices to target the
producer-thief relationship. This solution can only be effectively achieved
if legislators wait for licensing technology to advance so that producers can
clearly separate consumers from thieves. Once technology has caught up,
legislators should feel more comfortable enforcing criminal laws more
regularly against thieves or providing producers with a mechanism to
quickly recover civil damages.
¶45
Currently, there are no perfect technology solutions, but recent
trends in antipiracy technology shows that producers are close to bridging
the technology gap. Server side authentication is already used for some
mainstream software (e.g. Windows XP and Spore), but there is still a
problem with implementing the technology in a consumer-friendly way.
Although the world may never be rid of thieves who seek to pry the
technology gap wider with their own tools, as technology progresses, the
cost of such prying will increase so that it makes little economic sense for
thieves to steal. Regulations such as UCITA are overkill when technology
is so close to providing the clean solution.

